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it is undated and unsigned. The document is an incomplete history of the development of the Philippine Communist Party. The section covered by the available material is believed to be of historical interest for comparison with previously known facts of the growth and development of the Philippine Communist Party. The signature of Simeon A. Rodriguez, reportedly a ranking leader of the Party who was apprehended in the Manila raids, appears on the first page, presumably as an endorsement.

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INTRODUCTION

This is the first attempt to write a critical history of the Communist Party of the Philippines for the purpose of serving as curriculum in our Party school. Because of limitations of time, it has not been possible to make a painstaking research on the events in which the Party took active part since it was organized. Many of the first organizers of the CPP are either already dead or no longer active in the Party. Among the first organizers, the only remaining prominent leaders are Coms. Balgos and Capadocia. Because of the destruction of the last war, Party records and literature were lost so that it is extremely difficult to reconstruct

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in detail the history of the Party with the limited time available. However, in order to clarify certain doubtful events which is proposed to be treated in this history, a questionnaire was sent to leading Party members who, because of their actual active participation in the events treated are in the best position to shed light on the same. Consequently, the facts and events treated in this history, has been arrived at after a critical study of the answers to the questionnaire sent, aside from personal knowledge of the writer.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND PRECEDING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CPP

A- The Philippine Revolution of 1896.

Many books have already been written about the history of the Philippines, including the Philippine Revolution of 1896. Invariably, because of the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois point of view of the authors, the real essence of the revolution of 1896 has not been presented correctly. Neither has there been a critical appraisal of the basic causes of the failure of such revolution.

The Philippine revolution of 1896 was essentially a bourgeois-democratic-colonial revolution whose basic aims were: 1) emancipation from foreign domination; 2) land for the peasants and confiscation of big feudal landholdings, particularly the friar lands; and 3) establishment of a democratic republic. The aim to achieve emancipation from foreign domination made it a colonial or national revolution, while the aim to establish a democratic republic and to give lands to the peasants by confiscating feudal landholdings gave the revolution a bourgeois-democratic content.

What is the basic reason for the failure of the revolution?

Such failure was due to the failure to achieve proletarian hegemony over the revolution, especially after Aguinaldo ordered the killing of the proletarian leader and founder of the Katipunan, Andres Bonifacio, and the resulting division in the leadership of the revolution, with the vacillating, compromising petty-bourgeoisie and landlord leaders having the upperhand in the direction of the revolution. The proletariat failed to achieve hegemony over the revolution because it had no class organization of its own which in turn was due to the objective fact that capitalism was then in its earliest stages of development in our country, and consequently, the workers aside from being relatively few in number, were also not yet class conscious. Although the Katipunan was basically composed of peasants and workers, there was no attempt to limit its leadership to the genuine representatives of such classes, so that even during the early stages of the struggle, the compromising and vacillating petty-bourgeois leaders already had the upperhand.

There had been a continuous struggle within the leadership of the revolution between the advocates of determined struggle, non-compromise and non-surrender, led by Bonifacio and later by Mabini and Luna on one hand, and the advocates of compromise and surrender led by Aguinaldo, Buencamino and Paterno on the other. The advocates of compromise and surrender invariably won, resulting in the liquidation of the leaders and advocates of non-compromise and non-surrender: Bonifacio and Luna.

The Filipino revolutionists, notwithstanding such division in the leadership, succeeded in driving away their Spanish masters. But inexperienced as they were in the ways of imperialism, they accepted in good faith American help

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in driving away their Spanish conquerors. The American interventionists broke their agreement with the Filipino leaders, occupied Manila and immediately showed their intention to claim the Philippines as their own, thus leading to the Filipino war of national resistance against their American imperialist conquerors.

Even after the surrender of Aguinaldo and other revolutionary leaders, the Filipino peasants continued to fight against their new masters and it took the Americans sometime before they succeeded in suppressing the last remnants of resistance to their rule. After the collapse of the revolutionary resistance to the American imperialist conquest, there set in an ebb in the tide of the revolutionary struggle. After a short period of American military rule, a civil government run by Americans and their Filipino puppets and collaborators was established in 1902.

B. The American Imperialist Occupation of the Philippines.

It is not a mere coincidence that the Spanish-American war of 1898 should be timed with the Philippine revolution against Spain. With the end of the American civil war in 1865 and the consequent formal abolition of slavery in the United States, there had been a fast development of capitalist industry in the United States, resulting in the growth and development of trusts and monopolies which produced goods which could no longer be sold to the American consumers. Thus, American capitalists found it necessary to search for markets for their surplus goods as well as fertile fields for investments of their fast accumulating surplus capital. As far back as the 1880's, American experts and technologists came to the Philippines to investigate and survey the natural resources and wealth of our country, obviously to find out its investment possibilities.

When the Philippine revolution against Spain broke out in 1896, the rising American monopolists saw in it the opportunity to acquire the Philippines under the guise of American altruism. Taking advantage of the Havana incident, the United States declared war against Spain, and ordered Admiral Dewey to proceed to Manila Bay in order to destroy the Spanish Armada. Dewey immediately negotiated with the leaders of the Filipino revolutionists for a common struggle against the Spaniards, disclaiming then any intention to acquire the Philippines. Subsequent events early showed the insincerity of his promises.

The American monopolists wanted the Philippines not so much from what it can get directly from our country, but more as a good base for their domination and exploitation of Asia-Pacific countries, particularly China. It must be noted in this connection that the older imperialist powers like Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Czarist Russia, Spain, Holland, Belgium, Italy and even Portugal had imperialist bases in various Asia-Pacific countries much ahead of the American conquest of the Philippines. The Americans found no other remaining country to establish its foothold in Asia-Pacific except the Philippines. Hence, the timing of the Spanish-American war with the Philippine revolution against Spain.

Quickly realizing the insincerity of the American profession of altruism and friendship for the Filipinos, the Filipino revolutionists immediately struck back at their American conquerors. For two years the Filipino revolutionists fought bravely and conducted guerilla resistance against their conquerors, notwithstanding the compromising attitude and the continuous retreat of their leader Aguinaldo. While the Filipino revolutionists were still conducting guerilla resistance and Aguinaldo was continuously retreating, the feudal caciques and the ilustrados who remained loyal to Spain, immediately shifted their loyalties to the Americans and collaborated with them. It was these Filipino collaborators who prevailed upon the leaders of the anti-American guerilla resistance to lay down their arms, surrender to the Americans and accepted American sovereignty.

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After the collapse of organized revolutionary resistance and the establishment of civil government in 1902, the Filipino revolutionists and patriots, faced by powerful imperialist intervention, organized religious-patriotic-peasant movements and anti-imperialist-patriotic-labor movements. The Kolorums, led by Felipe Salvador and the Pulahanes were both organized as religious patriotic peasants movements to continue the struggle of the Katipunan, betrayed by its petty-bourgeois and landlord leaders who surrendered and immediately collaborated with the American Imperialists. Frustrated in their revolutionary aims, faced by a powerful combination of imperialist-friar-landlord forces, and without experience in guerilla warfare, the peasants took refuge in religion as a disguise to their essentially revolutionary-agrarian-nationalist aims. These peasants never gave up their firm belief that only armed struggle can achieve their aims, as shown by the Kolorum uprising in Pangasinan from 1924 to 1927 and subsequently in 1935, and the continuous armed harassment of the established government by the Pulahanes, even if only on a very minor and isolated scale. On the other hand, the revolutionary workers organized the openly anti-imperialist labor movement, the Union Obrera Democratica de Filipinas, led by Isabelo delos Reyes Sr., while the revolutionary petty-bourgeois intellectuals, also led by him, organized the Liga Anti-Imperialists. At about the same time, there developed a formal schism from the Roman domination of the Catholic church, and an independent Aglipay church established under Bishop Gregorio Aglipay, in collaboration with Isabelo de los Reyes Sr. In this connection, it is interesting to observe that Isabelo de los Reyes Sr. first learned his lessons on socialism and Communism during his stay in Spain before the outbreak of the Philippine revolution of 1896. Because of the absence then of a revolutionary working-class party, these early peasants and Workers' movements remained uncoordinated, and did not then constitute a decisive political force in our country.

Still fearful of the nationalist-revolutionary sentiments of the peasants and workers and busy with mopping-out operations against remnants of guerilla resistance, it took the American imperialists five years before they permitted the holding of national elections in our country in 1907. They permitted the holding of the election, secure in the belief that whatever party won in the election could collaborate with them and protect their vested interests. The imperialists wanted to enslave the remaining revolutionary sentiments of the Filipino masses by deviating their struggle for national liberation along non-revolutionary, parliamentary channels.

The defeat of the exposed collaborators of the American imperialists, the land-lord-backed Federalista Party, led by Araneta and Sumulong and other feudal caciques and ilustrados, in the hands of the petty-bourgeois nationalists led by the triumvirate Osmena-Palma-Quezon, merely reflected the basic and overwhelming desire of the masses, of peasant and workers for independence which then could not be achieved through armed struggle, and had to be fought for through parliamentary methods. The Nacionalista Party raised the election slogan of "immediate, absolute and complete independence" and came out in the elections with flying colors.

While the American imperialists were in the process of consolidating their political power in our country through their control of the puppet political leaders, they at the same time implemented cultural measures to win the basic sympathies of the people, without which their power would be very unstable and insecure. For this purpose, they established a school system patterned after the American school system with English as the exclusive language of instruction. Tagalog and other dialects were prohibited to be spoken in schools, school children caught speaking in the dialects were punished. For sometime, the flying of the Filipino flag was prohibited and even talks about the heroes of the Philippine revolution were prohibited and punished. Because of the patriotic fervor still gripping the children of the revolutionists, the imperialists sought to blunt such fervor by projecting the reformist Rizal as our national hero, relegating the proletarian founder and leader of the Katipunan, the revolutionary Andres Bonifacio, to

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the background. For sometime, the history of the Philippines was not taught in our schools, but the history of the United States was. When the history of our country was finally permitted to be taught, the imperialists and their Catholic church allies saw to it that the real essence of the Philippine revolution of 1896 and the roles of patriots and traitors to the revolution did not appear in the approved text-books.

With the defeat of the Federalista Party in the 1907 elections, the feudal caciques and ilustrados abandoned it and shifted their support to the Nacionalista Party. On the other hand, the Democrata Party, led by the petty-bourgeois Nationalists and democrats of the defunct Federalista Party was organized.

Secured in the political allegiance of the ruling Nacionalista Party, the American imperialists proceeded to consolidate their hold and domination of our country by passing the Payne-Aldrich Act in 1909, subsequently amended in 1913, imposing "reciprocal" trade relations between our country and the United States, whereby goods manufactured in the United States came in free of duty in "exchange" for our agricultural products and other raw materials coming in free of duty in the United States' markets. It was this basic trade relationship which created a comprador group among the Filipino big bourgeoisie and the shift of loyalties of the feudal landlords to the Nacionalista Party which transformed the Nacionalista Party leadership from a group of relatively sincere nationalists to one of unexposed puppets of American imperialists masquerading under the platform slogan of "immediate, absolute and complete independence".

Evidence that the leaders of the Nacionalista Party did not really mean to implement their platform slogan came as early as 1916, when Quezon rejected the Platt Amendment to the Jones Law fixing a definite date for the grant of Philippine independence, and instead agreed to independence "as soon as a stable government is established". Such action disillusioned the Nacionalista Party followers and minor leaders as to the sincerity of their top leaders about their clamor for independence. One of such disillusioned leaders was Com. Crisanto Evangelista who early saw that national liberation can not be achieved through mere parliamentary struggle and by sending of independence missions to the United States. Unfortunately, the people then had no party to turn to other than the Democrata Party, which did not and cannot offer any better method of struggling for independence, except through the sending of such independence missions to the United States.

Meanwhile, the first inter-imperialist world war broke out, as a result of which the weakest link in the chain of world imperialism was broken, and the dictatorship of the proletariat achieved in Russia which constitutes one sixth of the world. The inter-imperialist war and the victory of the Russian proletarian revolution produced immediate repercussions all over the world, including the Philippines. During the war years of 1914 to 1916, the Philippines enjoyed relative prosperity because it was not involved in the war and it could continue to produce materials which commanded high prices in the world markets. Such prosperity continued up to the early 1920's but was immediately followed by an economic crisis beginning 1921. The Philippines did not escape the consequences of the world-wide economic crisis which began in 1921 resulting in high prices, business failures, unemployment and growing mass discontent.

In 1919, Com. Evangelista then already a prominent leader of the Congreso Obrero de Filipinas (organized on May 1, 1912) and one of the middle rank leaders of the Nacionalista Party, was selected to be a member of one of the "independence" missions regularly sent by our country to the United States to plead for independence. Immediately, he realized that the top leaders of the NP were not really serious in their advocacy for independence, Com. Evangelista took upon himself the task, of contacting some leaders of the American Federation of Labor to get their endorsement of Philippine Independence. He succeeded in doing so.

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In the 1924 convention of the "Congreso Obrero de Filipinas" (Philippine Labor Congress), Com. Crisanto Evangelista was elected secretary. In 1925, Tan Malaca was sent by the Red Internationale of Labor Unions (Profintern) to the Philippines to invite the Philippine Labor Congress to participate in a trade union conference to be held at Canton. Among the participants of such conference were: the All-China Labor Federation, Australian Council of Trade Unions, Trade Unions League of the United States, Indonesia Labor Federation, Confederation General du Travail Unitaire Frances, Nippon Rodokumai Hyerikui Tsitsu Domei, National Minority Movement of England, Korean Workers and Peasants Federation, All-Russian Council of Trade Unions and Congreso Obrero de Filipinas. With the return of the Philippine delegates and their report to the Philippine Labor Congress convention of May, 1927, a resolution was passed after a sharp ideological struggle to affiliate the Philippine Labor Congress with the Red Internationale of Labor Unions. In that same convention, a resolution calling for the organization of a labor party was also passed. In this convention, for the first time the issue of communism began to be discussed among workers and so also were the class struggle and proletarian internationalism. As a result of the world-wide economic crisis of 1921 and its repercussions in the Philippines, there arose various peasant movements all over the country aside from the already existing worker's organization. The first class organization of the peasants was organized way back in 1919 in Matungaw, Bulacan, Bulacan. This organization spread to Cavite, Bataan, Laguna and Batangas and among the church haciendas. The scattered units of these peasant organizations were gathered together and organized under the name of "Confederacion de Aparceros de Filipinas", which later in 1924 was called the "Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magbubukid sa Filipinas" (KPLP). At about the same time in the Visayas, there was organized the "Kusog Sang Imol" (Bislig ng Mahirap). Besides the KPLP, which was the strongest and most well known among the peasant organizations, other peasant organizations like "Asosacion de Campesinos", "Oras Na", "Panahon Na", "Dumating Na", "Matang Lawin", "Liga de Aparceros" were also organized. The basic aims of these peasants' organizations were the following: 1) struggle against usury; 2) confiscation of friar lands and their distribution to landless peasants; 3) struggle against the harshness of landowners; 4) struggle for independence of the Philippines; 5) passage of laws to improve the economic condition of peasants; 6) establishment of economic cooperatives; and 7) establishment of rural banks and irrigation systems.

The Tanggulan and Sakdal peasant organizations were organized almost simultaneously in 1928, led respectively by Patricio Dionicio and Benigno Ramos. It is interesting to note the coincidence between the organization of these two organizations and the secret formulation of Baron Tanaka's memorial of the Japanese strategic plan of imperialist expansion and conquest of Asia-Pacific countries. Both Dionicio and Ramos maintained secret connections with the revolutionary exile, Artemio Ricarte, who promised them that the Japanese will aid the Filipino people in their armed struggle to overthrow American domination. While the Tanaka memorial was an imperialist plan of expansion and conquest, it was presented to the Asian peoples, including the Filipinos, as a revolutionary-nationalist struggle of the Asian peoples against "white" domination, under the leadership of Japan. The Japanese imperialists were very careful in avoiding anti-imperialist propaganda, and subtly directed the nationalist aspirations of the people along racial, chauvinistic nationalist lines. While the leadership of these two peasant organizations were mere puppets of their Japanese masters, their rank and file come from revolutionary-nationalist peasants some of whom were still confused and honestly believed the "liberation" aims of the Japanese, while others did not even know that their leaders had pro-Japanese orientations. At about this time Com. Evangelista and other labor and peasant leaders had already been indoctrinated in the class struggle and already understood the difference between proletarian, anti-imperialist nationalist and bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie racialist nationalism. Because of the developing proletarian, anti-imperialist nationalism, there developed a struggle among the peasant masses between the proletarian internationalists and the petty-

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bourgeoisie racialists. From the beginning, the racialists were winning because racial differences were much easier to understand than class differences. It was not until the exposure of the abject puppetry of the racialists to the Japanese imperialists, brought about by the continued struggle of the CPP, based on the class struggle, did the confused peasants rally around the banner of anti-imperialism.

While the Japanese imperialist expansionists were agitating the Filipino peasants through Ramos and Dionisio, to revolt against American domination of our country, at the same time, they were openly and secretly working among racial nationalists among the top political leaders of the Nationalista Party to sell the idea of Asia for Japan under the guise of "Asia for the Asiatics". They saw in Laurel who fought Wood in 1922, a most valuable tool for their expansionist purposes. Through a combination of subtle flattery and subtle bribery, appealing to patriotism and giving legal cases of Japanese firms to handle, they succeeded in getting Laurel, Subido and Duran, to espouse the "cause" of "Asia for the Asiatics", a very convenient front for Japanese expansionist aims.

In accordance with the resolution of the May 1927 convention of the Philippine Labor Congress regarding the organization of a working class party, Coms. Crisanto Evangelista, Antonio de Ora, Urbano Arcega, Nicolas de Guia, Norberto Nabong and others, organized the Partido Obrero in 1928. When Quezon heard that his former labor leaders were disaffiliating from the Nationalista Party, he instructed the constabulary and police to persecute the "red" labor leaders and instructed his loyal yellow labor leaders to take all steps to wrest the leadership of the Philippine Labor Congress from the "red" labor leaders. In the same year, Com. Crisanto Evangelista and Jacinto Manahan and Cirilo Bognot who later turned renegades, left the Philippines to attend a trade union conference held in Berlin and Moscow. When they returned, they reported to the Philippine Labor Congress the approval of its affiliation with the Profintern. When such affiliation was announced the reactionary landlords and capitalists began to be alarmed and Quezon, their puppet, issued a press statement denouncing Bolshevism. It was ably answered by Com. Evangelista. Impressed by such answer, the students of the University of the Philippines invited Com. Evangelista to a series of three open forums, but when the students showed favorable reaction to Com. Evangelista's first lecture, Quezon ordered the university authorities to stop the holding of subsequent forums.

In the May 1929 convention of the Philippine Labor Congress held at the Retono there was a decisive showdown between the labor leaders advocating class struggle and those advocating class collaboration led by such yellow leaders as Cristobal, Paguia and Tejada. These yellow labor leaders went to the convention determined to impose their leadership. They brought with them gangsters and dummy labor delegates without unions. The radical labor leaders and delegates led by Com. Evangelista walked out from the convention and held their own. This was the Philippine Labor Congress split. From then on, it became common to hear among workers about the struggle between "red labor unions" and "yellow labor unions", "internationalism" and "nationalism", "left" and "right", "progressive" and "reactionary", "pro-Russia" and "pro-America". In the convention of the progressive labor delegates held in May 5, 1929, it was decided to organize the Kongreso Proletario de Filipinas. (Katipunan ng mga Anakpawis ng Pilipinas---KPI KAP). In this convention, a resolution was passed to organize a working-class party to direct and lead the working class in their independent political and economic struggles. It was also decided to abandon "craft unionism" in favor of "industrial unionism."

CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION OF THE CPP - IT'S STRUGGLE UNTIL THE OUT-BREAK
OF THE PACIFIC WAR
IN 1941

A. Actual Organization and Launching of the CPP:

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By way of implementing the resolution of the KAP in its first convention concerning the establishment of a working class party, a committee of delegates of workers and peasants was created to formulate the program of action and constitution of such party. The committee was composed of Comrades Evangelista, Antonio de Ora and Arturo Soriano, and the renegades Jacinto Manahan and Jose Quirante. This committee decided to make the program of action of the then existing Partido Obrero, which was organized by Coms. Evangelista and others, the basis of the program of action of the new party, inasmuch as the aims of the Partido Obrero were Marxist in character and based on the principle of the class struggle. The committee presented the results of its work in the conference of the Central Committee of the KAP in July 1930. The conference approved the program presented by the committee and set August 26, 1930, (Cry of Balintawak) as the date for the formal organization of the new party and the approval of its program of action.

On August 26, 1930, sixty leading representatives of various workers and peasants organizations met at Templo del Trabajo, in which were also present representatives of Chinese workers. The presidium of the meeting was composed of Coms. Evangelista and Ora, and the renegades Manahan, Hilario and Quirante. The meeting approved the program of action of the proposed workers' party, elected its Central Committee and Political Bureau, and decided upon its name. There was a difference of opinion as to the proper name to be given to the new party. Among the names proposed were Partido Komunista, Partido Bolshevik, Partido Obrero Proletario, and Partido Socialista. After a lengthy discussion, Com. Evangelista's proposal to name the new party, Partido Komunista, was finally approved. The following were elected members of the first Central Committee of the Party:

1. Crisanto Evangelista printer
2. Felix Caguin "
3. Arturo Soriano "
4. Mariano P. Balgos "
5. Jose Quirante employee
6. Jacinto Manahan peasant
7. Juan Feleo "
8. Silvino Tablan employee
9. Alejandro Espanola peasant
10. Antonio de Ora lumberman
11. Norberto Nabong Electrician
12. Guillermo Capadocia Cook
13. Jose Ventura cigar maker
14. Sotero Samson lumberman
15. Patricio Dionisio journalist
16. Mariano Pingol lumberman
17. Balbino Navarro cigar maker
18. Angel Mesina "
19. Hugo Rotaga marine
20. Saturnino Bricso marine
21. Andrew Fabian cigar maker
22. Cirilo Honorio slipper-maker
23. Urbano Arcega "
24. Cenen Lacaniente cigar maker
25. Cirilo Bognot newspaperman
26. Nicolas de Guia writer
27. Andres Padua lumberman
28. Juan Lagman railway worker
29. Enrique Torrente electrician
30. Maximo Macatangay cook
31. Andres Santiago cigar maker
32. Teofilo Espirito "
33. A representative from the Chinese (Cocingliat)
34. " " " " (Ping)
35. " " " " (Co)

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The first CC elected the members of the first political Bureau: Evangelista, Ora, Manahan, Feleo, Caguin, Arcaga, and a Chinese representative. The CC approved the flag and emblem of the Party and decided to officially launch the new Party before the people on November 7, 1930. It also decided to launch a mass campaign for Party membership, whereby any one could become a member of the Party provided that he agreed with its program of action and program of government. It also decided to participate in the election of 1931.

The essence of the aims of the Party were: 1) unite the workers and peasants and the exploited masses in general in their own class organizations; 2) struggle against and overthrow the rule of American imperialism in the Philippines; 3) struggle for the betterment of the living and working conditions of the workers and peasants; 4) struggle to achieve immediate, absolute and complete independence of the Philippines and establish a real peoples' government; 5) unite with the revolutionary movements the world over, especially among the colonial countries; and 6) establish the Soviet system in the Philippines.

On November 7, 1930, 5,000 people gathered at Plaza Moriones to attend the official launching of the new Party. In this meeting, the program of the new Party was explained to the people who were asked for and gave their approval. During the meeting, 3,000 applications for membership were distributed among the people gathered. Manahan announced that the KAP and the KPLP are the left and right wings of the CPP. Because of such announcement the government authorities and the American imperialists from the beginning considered that both these organizations were also Communist organizations.

In January 1931, the CPP opened its national office and issued its organ, the TTIS. The first editorial staff were composed of Coms. Evangelista, Capadocia, Torante, Caguin, and Boriano.

It will be seen that in the beginning, the CPP was completely legal and accepted membership en masse without careful selection. Immediately after the organization of the CPP, it launched a series of mass meetings, not only in the city of Manila but also in the neighboring provinces of Central and Southern Luzon. Because of the aggressiveness in its organizational and propaganda campaign, the Catholic church, the bourgeoisie-owned newspapers and the government launched a counter-campaign against the CPP under the sponsorship of the reactionary landlords and capitalists. Meetings were disturbed and heckled by paid gangsters, and permits for many meetings refused. In many cases, permits granted were cancelled at the last moment. Invariably, the Communist leaders went ahead with or without permits, and their speeches were warmly applauded by the large audience, notwithstanding the annoyance, persecutions and threats of the government authorities and their agents. As a result of this initial government persecution, some members of the CC (C. Eugno, Patricio Dionisio and Jose Quirante) quit the Party. Coms. Evangelista and Capadocia were charged with the offenses of sedition and meeting without permit for which they were sentenced with two months imprisonment and fined in the amount of P1,000.00. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court. At about the same time, a representative from the American Communist Party came to the Philippines and through him, the CPP was connected with the Communist Party of the United States.

In 1931, the Party presented its candidates for election, but the government, while accepting the certificates of candidacy of the Party's candidates, refused to grant permits for Party meetings. Com. Capadocia and other members were arrested for meeting and posting election posters without permits. At the same time, Com. Feleo was already being persecuted and was actually charged of inciting to sedition and rebellion in Nueva Ecija.

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When the KAP decided to celebrate May 1, 1931 by means of a demonstration and parade, it was refused a permit by the Manila authorities. A permit was granted by the authorities of Caloocan, Rizal, but when the meeting was about to open, because of the great number of people who attended, the permit was cancelled. The meeting was continued, notwithstanding the cancellation of the permit. When Com. Evangelista began to speak, Major Jalandoni and Lt. Javalera arrested him, but the people who attended refused to leave the meeting, forcing the government authorities to call the firemen of Manila to drive away the people by means of fire-hoses. Com. Ora drew his revolver and only the presence of cooler comrades prevented the out-break of violence provoked by the government authorities. In this meeting the renegade Manahan already showed the first sign of wavering when he left the meeting due to fear without the knowledge of his comrades.

In May 1931, after its May 1 celebrations, the KAP held its convention in which were present 400 delegates from various workers' organizations. Before the convention ended, government secret service agents led by Americans, arrested all the delegates, and after two days of temporary detention, charged the following of organizing an illegal association: Crisanto Evangelista, Jacinto Manahan, Juan Feleo, Guillermo Capadocia, Antonio de Ora, Mariano Balgos, Balbino Navarro, Lucio Pilapil, Cenen Lacaniente, Eduardo Donato, Catalino Monrey, Teofilo Espiritu, Andres Fabian, Salustiano Rios, Enrique Torrente, Alfonso Pangilinan, Hugo Retaga, Urbano Arcega, Saturnino Briose, Jose Ventura, Remegio Tolentino, Dominador Ambrocio, Dominador Reyes, Juan Laguan, Maximo Gutierrez, Andres Santiago, Angel Mesina, Felipe Cruz, P. Pangilinan. Some of them were also charged with the offence of sedition. Three of them, (Eduardo Donato, Hugo Retaga and P. Villanueva) turned government witnesses, and later one of them Andres Santiago became a secret agent of the constabulary. As a result of this wholesale arrests and criminal prosecution, Patricio, Dionisio, Retaga, Quirante, Hilario and Bognot resigned from the KAP. Even Francisco Varona and Domingo Ponce who were formerly sympathetic to the KAP already began to refuse invitations to attend meetings of the KAP. This wholesale arrest and criminal prosecution resulted in the demoralization of many, but the militant stand of its staunch leadership attracted more members who were ready to struggle and espouse the cause of the working class.

B. Outlawing of the CPP:

The Party answered the government charge of the crime of sedition and rebellion. Com. Evangelista brilliantly acquitted himself in the trial and presented a memorandum to the Supreme Court explaining the aims of the Party, the dialectical laws of development of human society, and why and how the exploited workers and peasants are inevitably led to struggle for their emancipation from exploitation. The bourgeoisie-dominated Supreme Court declared the CPP an illegal association and found the Communist leaders guilty of inciting to sedition and rebellion, and sentenced them with varying terms of imprisonment.

Why did the government illegalize the CPP?

The American imperialists and their allies, the reactionary Filipino landlords and capitalists were beginning to find out that the exploited peasants and workers were enthusiastically rallying around the cause sponsored by the CPP. In all its meetings the Communist leaders explained why the peasants and workers are being exploited, how they were being exploited and who were exploiting them. They urged the exploited masses to organize and struggle against their landlords and capitalists and their government, and exposed the government as being merely the tool of the exploiting classes. They pointed out effective methods of struggle and forms of organization by which the exploited can achieve their demands. They exposed how foreign imperialists exploit our country and people, and in what way the government was being utilized as an instrument of imperialist exploitation. They explained to the people how in the Soviet Union, there was prosperity, contentment and full employment, and urged them to follow the revolutionary path blazed by the Russian people.

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Besides this correct propaganda, "leftist" and sectarian propaganda were also dished out by some Communist leaders to their hearers. For example, in mass meetings, some Communist leaders openly denied the existence of God and called God as a mere illusion.

Samples of the line of propaganda of the Communist leaders were the following: "the bourgeoisie are thieves;" the bourgeoisie are all extremely shameless;" "Rizal did not like revolution, but merely reform;" "cut off the necks of the bourgeoisie;" "all those in power are mere manikins of the American imperialists;" "all yellow labor leaders should die with the bourgeoisie;" "the bourgeoisie are suckers of the workers' blood and they should be burned", "the Philippines is a country of the bourgeoisie and only the Soviet Union is the land for the proletariat;" "the scythe in our banner is for cutting off the necks of the bourgeois thieves and the hammer to strike the heads of bourgeoisie until they die;" "down with this government for this is a government of the dominant American imperialists;" "if we don't get our demands through petitions, get them by hook or by crook;" "blood, blood and only blood can wash away such corruptions that are happening in our country, so do not hesitate to offer your blood;" "all friars are liars in heaven;" "there is no God, God is but a mere illusion."

The Party propaganda, notwithstanding some sectarian tendencies, proved very effective among the exploited peasants and workers, who at that time were suffering from the effects of the world-wide depression which began in 1929 in the United States and had its repercussions in the Philippines. As a matter of fact, the organization of the CPP in 1930 was but the organizational reflection of the heightening flow in the revolutionary tide. It will be remembered that after the defeat of the Filipino revolutionists in the hands of the American imperialist interventionists, there set in an ebb in the tide of the revolution reaching its lowest depth around 1901. Since then, the ebb continued for many years and its tide gradually began to rise until the beginning of the general crisis of world capitalism, reflected in the outbreak of the first world war. The rising tide of the revolutionary ebb developed into the beginnings of the revolutionary flow only after the world economic crisis which began in 1921. From then on peasants and workers organizations sprouted like mushrooms and they became more militant and class conscious, culminating in the organization of the CPP in 1930.

This was the background of the subsequent militant struggles of the peasants' and workers' organizations under the leadership of the CPP which led to its outlawing. As a result of such outlawing, the Party went underground and conducted its struggle in leading the masses in their struggles from underground.

C. Organization of the Socialist Party:

Immediately after the outlawing of the CPP Com. Pedro Abad Santos organized the Socialist Party in 1932. In organizing such party and calling it "Socialist Party," Com. Abad Santos had no intention of patterning his party after the socialist parties of the Blum and Thomas variety. Because the Communist Party was outlawed, he wanted to continue its work without giving any reason for the reactionary landlords and capitalists and their government to outlaw his party. He felt that at that time his party would reach more masses if it continued to fight legally than if it struggled from underground. In his discussion with Com. James Allen, representative of the CPUS, who negotiated for the merger of the CPP and the SFP, he explained the tactical considerations which made him adopt the name "Socialist Party" and expressed also his desire to affiliate his Party with the Communist International.

Because of the aggressive and militant organizational and propaganda campaign and leadership over the struggle of the exploited masses, the Socialist Party and the AIT spread rapidly in the provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Bataan, some towns in Nueva Ecija, Batangas, and even in Manila.

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With the organization of the SPP and the AIT, there immediately arose ideological as well as organizational differences concerning forms of organization and methods of struggle between the CPP and the SPP. One of the most important differences arose regarding the correct organizational structure of the AIT. The AIT was composed of peasants and agricultural and industrial workers. The CPP took the position that the workers, as the rising class in our developing capitalist economy, should be organized separately from the peasants, considering that they are really different classes. On the other hand, the SPP claimed that the peasants of Central Luzon were very poor, property-less and extremely exploited, no less than workers of existing industries, and that they were far more militant than any other group of toilers. In organizing the poor peasants and workers into a single national workers union, the Socialists claimed that the workers were organized separately in their own organizations and merely affiliated with the AIT. It is obvious that in the difference of opinion between the Socialists and the Communists both committed errors of theory and organization. The Socialists failed to grasp clearly the leading role of the proletariat, considering the poor peasants as equally revolutionary as, if not more so than, the workers. On the other hand, the Communists committed the error of thinking that because of the different class character of peasants and workers, peasants' and workers' organizations should not be affiliated with a common mother organization like the AIT. It was only necessary to recognize and project the leading role of the proletariat in such organizational alliance.

Another serious disagreement was the lack of differentiation between the Party and the mass organization as far as the SPP and the AIT were concerned. Following the well-known Leninist concept of the Communist Party as the vanguard of the working class, the Communists made a clear distinction between the CPP on one hand and the KAP and KWP on the other. The Socialists, on the other hand, did not make any distinction between the SPP and the AIT. Because of the failure to make such distinction, AIT mass members were considered as members also of the SPP. This explains the lack of organizational life and loose organizational procedures and discipline within the SPP. Such looseness and anarchy in organization were brought by the Socialists into the merged Communist and Socialist Parties.

Still another serious conflict was in the method of conducting mass struggles and mass actions. The Communists had a tendency to be too legalistic, especially after the outlawing of the CPP. Instead of leading the masses in militant and direct mass actions to give them valuable revolutionary experiences, as the Socialists did, they had a tendency to project the legalistic methods of struggle. On the other hand, the Socialists, notwithstanding some errors of "leftism" and sectarianism, led the exploited peasants and workers in militant and direct struggles and mass actions, giving their masses better revolutionary experiences devoid of legalist illusions.

D. The World Economic Depression, Philippine "Independence" Law and the Growth of Fascism:

Meanwhile, as a result of the world-wide economic depression, which began in the United States in 1929, Nazism triumphed in Germany in 1933 and international fascism was on the war path. In the Philippines, the continued depression in the United States made competition with some of our export products harmful to American agricultural interests, like the competition of our sugar cane with beet sugar in the United States. It also made competition of Filipino labor in the United States harmful to American labor. These conflicts of economic interests, in addition to the continuous agitation for independence by the organized workers' and peasants' movements following Communist leadership, led to the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie "independence" law in 1934. The T-M "independence" law provided for "independence" in 10 years; gradual limitation of duty-free, agricultural exports to the US; limitations and restrictions on Filipino immigration to the US; reserved military and naval and coaling stations for the United States armed forces in our country; provided for a commonwealth form of government in which the essence of sovereignty

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resided in the US government, while the form of independence and sovereignty was conceded to the Filipinos as a sop to their militant nationalist aspirations. Prodded by the Japanese expansionists, using Dionisio and Ramos, the Tanggulans were made to revolt in 1933 and the Sakdals in 1934. Both these revolts were short-lived.

Outside the Philippines, Japanese fascist imperialism, following Baron Tanaka's memorial on the strategic plan of Japanese expansion, invaded Manchuria in 1931 and set up a puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932. Subsequently, it created an incident in China leading to its invasion of the Chinese mainland in 1937. Italian fascist imperialism invaded Ethiopia while German fascist imperialism was busy making preparations for a new war for a redivision of colonies. Faced by such a formidable array of fascist imperialist aggressors, American imperialism recognized the Soviet Union in 1933 as a first step towards the development of a coalition of anti-fascist forces to stem the tide of the fascist onslaught.

In the face of the dangers caused by international fascism led by Hitlerite Germany, the Soviet Union and the Communist Internationale called for a united front of all forces of democracy and peace against fascism and war. The Soviet Union forged collective security pacts with its neighboring countries, established diplomatic relations with the US, hastened its peaceful reconstruction and made preparations for defensive war against fascist aggression.

E. Release of Communist Leaders and Merger of the CPP and SPP:

The foreign policies of the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the forging of an anti-fascist coalition had its local repercussions in the Philippines. Com. James Allen, representative of the CPUS, came over the Philippines and negotiated with Quezon for the release of the imprisoned CP leaders and for the legalization of the CPP. At first, the CP leaders were reluctant to accept pardons from the bourgeois government which they considered as their enemy. Finally, they were prevailed upon to accept such pardons, obviously convinced that the main enemy for the time being was fascism.

Immediately after the release of the top CP leaders in 1938, Com. Allen in consultation with the CPP leaders negotiated with Com. Abad Santos and the Socialist leaders for a merger of these two parties. There were no fundamental ideological differences between the two parties, and whatever obstacles there were to the merger was due merely to personal animosities and petty sectarianism between middle rank Communist and Socialist leaders. Some objections raised by some Socialists against the merger were: a) the Communists are Godless; b) they are Moscow agents; c) the KMP is destroying the organization of the ALT; d) the merger will lower the prestige of Com. Abad Santos and 5) the Communists are not militant.

Notwithstanding petty sectarianism, the merger was finally agreed upon and the same was formalized in the Party convention of 1938. The basis for the merger are the following: a) the name of the merged party is the Communist Party of the Philippines (merger of the Communist and the Socialist Party of the Philippines); b) the KMP and the ALT will remain as separate organizations and both of them will be supervised by the peasant department of the merged Party in which both Communists and Socialists will have representation; c) the various organizations of the Socialist Party will be reorganized following the organizational structure of the merged Party; d) both parties will have representation in the leading and principal organs of the merged Party; and e) in Pampanga and in some towns of Tarlac and Bataan where the Socialist Party is strong, the Socialists shall have supervision over the Party organs and mass organizations.

Even after the merger was formalized, there remained some differences which had to be hurdled before the merged Party could achieve unity of will and action. Among such differences which had to be hurdled are the following:

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a) Because of the weakness of the Socialists in organizational life and their inadequate understanding of the Leninist concept of the Communist Party, many of their leading cadres failed frequently to attend meetings of the leading organs of the merged party. Everytime they were reminded of such meetings, their answer was: "they are agreed to every decision arrived at;" b) The Socialists were slow in organizing Party nucleus within the AMT, and everytime they were criticized they answered that it was not necessary to organize such nucleus, because all of them were members of the AMT, the Frente Popular and of the CPP, besides being loyal, militant and trustworthy comrades; c) Most of the Socialist leaders and cadres were reluctant and lazy to study, some of them being satisfied with the "Ting Catala" and the local "pasion" for which Socialist leaders were famous. One of them even boasted that "if Marx were alive, I will teach him Socialism;" d) Com. Abad Santos often made press statements without consultation with the PB to which he belonged, and sometimes his press statements deviated from the established political line of the CPP; e) While the Socialists carted away all the palay produced by the peasants, cut mangroves, burn sugar-cane fields, carted all the corn, vegetables, fish or any product in dispute and let the feudal landlords go to court for redress of grievances, the Communists advocated strict adherence to open legal struggle. They were always very careful in presenting petitions to landlords, and in going to the courts for redress of grievances or to plead better accounting and increased participation in crop sharing.

F. Local Implementation of the Anti-Fascist United Front:

In the local implementation of the Comintern policy of the United front against fascism, the Party committed many errors of both "left" and right opportunism. The Party considered the anti-fascist united front not merely as a strategic policy but actually as a form of organization. Instead of drawing the anti-fascist elements from every existing political party into a united front against local fascism and fascist practices, it organized the Frente Popular as an election political party, including in such party well known reactionaries like Juan Sumulong of the defunct Federalista and Democrata Parties, opportunists like Miguel Cornejo of the Reformist party, the pro-Japanese, Alvero, and the clown, Hueno. The Party organized the Frente Popular more as an oppositionist party than as a united front against fascism. The Party was also guilty of extreme sectarianism in dealing with its united front allies. It resorted to capturing the leadership of the Frente Popular not through persuasive propaganda or through active organizational work of Communist leaders, but through sheer majority in numbers, a weakness which persisted even up to the organization of the Democratic Alliance. In the organization of the Frente Popular, the Party had a tendency to work only among the top leadership of the organizations affiliated with it, without any work being done among the rank and file of these affiliated organizations. The result was the rank and file of these affiliated organizations and parties were not made conscious of the anti-fascist aims of the Frente Popular. Because of its inadequate understanding of main enemy and direction of the main blow, the Party had a tendency to alienate its bourgeois and petty bourgeois allies within the Frente Popular. Even while we were forging a united front against fascism, our comrades openly denounced our bourgeois allies within the united front, openly warning that the day will come when such allies will become our enemy because they are our class enemy. The Frente Popular was basically considered by the Party as a parliamentary election party and many of our comrades expressed approval of the inclusion of certain bourgeoisie and opportunist political leaders in the Frente Popular, even if they did not subscribe to the aims of the anti-fascist struggle, simply because they have a large electoral following. The legalist illusions of the Party was shown in the selection of candidates for the 1930 election, when it insisted in the selection of its own candidates, even at the price of breaking the Frente Popular. This led to the formal break of the Frente Popular into two groups in 1940, respectively led by Com. Abad Santos and Sumulong.

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but these struggles were not sharp, because the ideological and personal leadership of Com. Evangelista was unchallenged due to the relatively low political maturity of the Party leaders and members at that time. There were no clear formulations of strategy and tactics. Organizational life was loose and inadequate, discipline was lax, and educational work was very weak, with the Party not conducting any study meeting among its organs, from the highest to the lowest. Leadership within the Party and among the masses was personal rather than organizational. The Party members and the masses followed the leadership of prominent Communist leaders like Coms. Evangelista, Capadocia, Abad Santos, Balgos, Castillo and Feleo and when lesser rank cadres go down to these Party members and masses, they were reluctant to follow the latter's leadership.

Among the early ideological struggles which agitated the Party leadership were the following: a) Which should be considered as the proletariat that should assume the leading role in our revolution? Com. Feleo and the renegade, Manahan, took the position that the poor peasants should be considered as the proletariat, because the Philippines is an agrarian country and the peasants greatly outnumbered the workers, and because of the revolutionary traditions of the peasants compared to that of the workers. To support their contention, they claimed (1932) that the Philippines was still under a feudal economy and not under a capitalist economy, and that under a feudal economy, the poor peasants constitute the proletariat. On the other hand, Coms. Evangelista and Capadocia took the position that the proletariat are the factory workers in the growing industries, because they are the most class conscious, and even if they were relatively fewer in number than the peasants, unlike them, the working class is a growing class. This controversy was only finally settled when the Comrades of the Chinese section gave their opinion that the proletariat are those who have shown militance, loyalty, industry, studiousness and class consciousness, whether they come from workers, peasants or petty bourgeois origin, provided that the latter are already proletarianized. The Chinese comrades also added that the majority of the proletariat come from the factory workers, because they are the most exploited and, therefore, the most revolutionary in their outlook and action. This opinion was accepted by the majority of the Party leadership with Com. Feleo and the renegade, Manahan expressing their reservations pending further study; b) Is it correct to accept conditional pardon from Quezon's government? This issue arose when Quezon offered conditional pardon to the imprisoned Communist leaders. The renegade, Manahan, immediately accepted the offer even without waiting for any Party decision. All other comrades followed the leadership of Com. Evangelista in refusing such offer on the ground that acceptance will demoralize the mass movements which the Party is leading. The underground PB and even the CC members took the position that such offer should be accepted, if only in order to put a stop to factionalism and intrigues within the Party which developed during the imprisonment of the top communist leaders. This issue divided the PB leadership because even those who favored acceptance of the offer changed their stand after they learned that the imprisoned comrades refused to abide by the decision. The division within the PB leadership was healed only when Com. Capadocia was able to go out and explain to them that the offer of conditional pardon prohibited the leaders to be pardoned from engaging in any political activity. c) Is it correct to help the Sakdalistas in their revolt against the government? In a conference of the CC, there was a difference of opinion regarding the correctness of helping the Sakdalistas. There was no decision to help or not to help and instead the decision was formulated as follows "even if it is true that the Sakdalista revolt is anti-American imperialist in orientation, the Sakdalistas themselves are tools of the Japanese imperialist militarists, and hence, while the Party will continue its struggle against American imperialism, it will, at the same time, fight against the Japanese imperialists and their local instruments, in order not to confuse the Filipino people." Even with this decision, those who favored helping the Sakdalistas were not satisfied; d) Was it correct for the Party to take a stand against the action of Com. Asedillo in defying the government? This issue arose when

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Com. Asedillo took to the mountains and defied the government authorities after killing some constabulary men, policemen and spies of the government, immediately after the government authorities attempted to arrest him for his participation in the historic and bloody strike at the La Minerva in 1934. There was a difference of opinion within the CC regarding the correctness of defining the stand of the Party, disagreeing with Com. Asedillo's defiance of the government. There was no final position taken by the Party, but the comrades from Laguna resented the vacillation of the Party in not taking a position in support of Com. Asedillo; e) Were the Socialists correct in their liquidation of individual landlords, burning of sugar cane and rice fields, killing work-animals and utilizing threats and force to coerce people to join our organization? Com. Evangelista took the position that such actions are terroristic and anarchist in character and violate the principles and democratic procedures followed by the Party. On the other hand, Com. Abad Santos took the position that all means which would strengthen the revolutionary forces and hasten the victory of the revolution should be utilized, and that these include the actions objected to by the Communists. He claimed that while he agrees that these actions should not be made an open policy of the Party, they should be resorted to as secret methods of struggle.

During this period the Party produced powerful agitators and orators without much foundation on Marxist and Leninist theory. This period can rightly be called the period of the Party's infancy.

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CHAPTER III

Growth Development and Struggles of the Party During the Japanese Occupation.

A. Correctness of the Party Appraisal of the Political Situation and Call for Anti-Japanese United Front and Guerilla Resistance:

Since 1937, and specially so after the Party's 1938 convention, the Party has been continuously warning the Filipino people of the threat of Japanese fascist aggression and the need for a national united front against fascism and fascist aggression. The masses reached by the Party understood the fascist threat and acted and prepared accordingly. The Nationalista Party puppets of American imperialism, true to their class interest, refused to heed the Party's warning, and, when the Party and the mass organizations led by it sponsored a nation-wide boycott of Japanese goods through the "Congress for Peace and Collective Security", the "Friends of China" and the "League for the Defense of Democracy", Quezon not only refused to grant permits for meetings and demonstrations but even threatened to arrest the leaders of such movement.

The Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December 1941, showed the correctness of the Party's appraisal of the political situation. Immediately, the Party leadership met and mapped out a concrete course of action. Subsequently, the Party issued a 12-point appeal to the Filipino people, which appeal was embodied in a memorandum sent by the Party to Quezon, Sayre and MacArthur. Among the salient points of the appeal were: the arming of the people to support the Armed Forces of the Philippines to repel Japanese aggression; the organization of guerilla resistance against the Japanese conquerors should they finally succeed in occupying the Philippines; and the rallying of the people into a nation-wide anti-Japanese united front regardless of their political, economic and social differences. Quezon, Sayre and MacArthur refused to arm the people, obviously fearful of the consequences that would be brought about by a people-in-arms.

The retreat of the Filipino and American forces to Bataan is now a matter of history. Notwithstanding the boast of MacArthur that he can defend the Philippines and the repeated promises of aid to come from the United States, MacArthur was forced to surrender Bataan in less than five months after the initial Japanese invasion, and Corregidor soon thereafter. MacArthur fled to Australia while the puppet leaders Quezon, Osmena and Romulo abandoned

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their country to establish the so called "exiled government."

Even while the American and Filipino forces were still fighting in Bataan and Corregidor, the Nationalista puppets of American imperialism; true to the role of their class, demonstrated since the revolution of 1896, immediately collaborated with the Japanese invaders to preserve their lives and properties, under the screen of "protecting the interest of the people."

While the puppets were perfecting their preparations to collaborate with their new Japanese masters, the CPP on the other hand was busy preparing the organization of guerilla resistance against the fascist conquerors. The leading cadres of the Party were divided in various strategic regions of Central Luzon, Manila and Southern Luzon, with the great bulk concentrated in Central Luzon. Although there were certain weaknesses resulting in the failure of the rank and file to immediately receive instructions concerning the new situation, by and large, the Party leadership and the middle organs remained intact, and it did not take long for these organs to resume organizational life and implement the decisions of the Party leadership to organize guerilla resistance against the invaders.

In January 1942, miscalculating the degree of enemy suppression, the top leadership of the CPP, Coms. Evangelista, Abad Santos and Capadocia were arrested by the Japanese and subsequently imprisoned at Fort Santiago. While such loss constituted a great damage to the Party, the Japanese did not thereby cripple the CPP which very early the Japanese announced as its "first and last enemy." In accordance with previous decisions, the second front under the leadership of Com. VY immediately assumed the leadership. In accordance with plans also, the Central Luzon Bureau (CLB), was immediately organized and concrete plans of organizing guerilla groups, discussed, decided upon, and finally implemented. The first encounter between the Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon) and the Japanese took place on March 15, 1942. The Hukbalahap was formally presented to the people on March 22, 1942.

The Japanese tactics in releasing Com. Capadocia to convince the Party leaders to have a "united front with the Japanese against the feudal landlords," tested both the political and organizational vigilance of the Party leadership. Com. Capadocia was arrested, investigated and expelled from the Party, and given an assignment with the armed forces. The Party leadership did not deviate from its anti-Japanese united front policy. After Capadocia showed loyalty and militance since he was thus expelled, he was subsequently readmitted into the CPP in accordance with a decision of the May 1948 CC conference.

At the beginning, the exploited peasants of Central Luzon found very much difficulty in accepting the national anti-Japanese united front. They were just waiting for such a situation as a war to liquidate their landlord enemies, and when the Party urged them to subordinate their conflict with their landlord enemies in the interest of a common struggle against the Japanese invaders, many of them could not understand the correctness of the policy, and even those who understood the policy were reluctant to accept the same. Consequently, there were some individual liquidations of reactionary landlords like Tapia of the Pasudeco. Through the decisive leadership of the Party, such killings for individual revenge were stopped immediately.

One of the immediate problems confronted by the Party was rampant banditry. With the breakdown of law and order resulting from the collapse of the American-puppet government and the installation of the Japanese-puppet government, bandits saw an opportunity to prey on helpless victims. The Party immediately called for the organization of Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC) which, in conjunction with the HUKs, immediately liquidated the threat of banditry in the fields and barrios.

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B. Weaknesses of the Party's Strategic Formulations:

Although the Party made plans for the organization of a national anti-Japanese united front and for the conduct of guerilla resistance against the Japanese invaders, its formulation of strategy was very incomplete and inadequate. The only correct and clear formulation was the aims of our strategy from which was determined the identity of the main enemy, the Japanese fascists. There was no clear formulation of the main force of the struggle, the reserves, (direct and indirect) the direction of the main blow of the proletariat, and the strategic disposition of forces. The slogan "Anti-Japanism Above All" was projected. By the projection of such slogan the Party did not distinguish between various classes of anti-Japanese elements. Because of the incompleteness and inadequacy of our strategic formulations, the Party committed the following serious errors:

a) The Party concentrated on the peasantry to the almost total exclusion of the workers in the cities; b) The Party abolished the class organization of the peasants and substituted for it the united front organization of the BUDC; c) The Party considered the Japanese puppets as the direction of the main blow of the proletariat and consequently, failed to consider US imperialism and its puppets, the leadership of the USAFFE guerillas, as the object of the direction of the main blow.

The Party concentrated on the peasantry to the almost total exclusion of the workers in the cities. This error obviously was the result of the tendency to consider the poor peasantry as the main force of the revolution. In this connection, in one of the books written by Com. Mao Tse Tung, it was clearly stated that the peasantry constitutes the "main foundation" of the revolution in China. It was very possible that the Party leadership then interpreted this to mean that the peasantry constitutes the main force of our revolution. Again, it must be remembered that before the Pacific war broke out and early in the history of the Party, Com. Teleso even took the extreme position that the poor peasantry constitutes the proletariat in an agricultural country like the Philippines, which should furnish the leadership of the revolution. Because of such concentration among the peasantry to the almost total exclusion of the workers in the cities, the Party organization in Manila and the workers movement it was leading were greatly weakened, and up to now the effects of such weakening are still being felt.

The Party also abolished the peasants' class organization (KPLP and ALT) and substituted in their place the united front BUDC organizations. This was done to facilitate unity with the anti-Japanese landlords. Because of the inadequate understanding by the Party leadership on the question of the direction of the main blow of the proletariat, the Party merely saw the need for unity with the anti-Japanese landlords and failed to see the continuation of a struggle within that unity. This situation did not continue for long. The Party, realizing its mistake, reorganized the class organizations of the peasants within the united front BUDC organizations.

The Party considered the Japanese puppets as the object of the direction of the main blow of the proletariat instead of considering them as a part of the main enemy because they served as instruments of the enemy. Because of such error, the Party failed to consider US imperialism and the pro-American capitalists and landlords and their USAFFE guerilla leaders as the object of the direction of the main blow. US imperialism and the pro-American capitalists and landlords, while anti-Japanese, were nonetheless very much afraid of a people's revolutionary liberation movement spearheaded by the HUKs and led by the CPP. Consequently, MacArthur instructed the USAFFE guerillas to lie low and wait for his coming. It is true that the Party exposed the incorrectness of such policy of lie-low and awaitism. Because of such exposure, the people rallied around the HUKs as against the USAFFEs which resulted in the continuing clashes between the two groups. However, the Party failed to clearly project to the masses the war aims of US imperialism, so that when the Americans came, they were hailed as liberators by the people, including even our own masses, instead of being considered as conquerors which they really were. All these led to the confusion in our

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policy in seeking American recognition of the HUKS and even to the defection of such formerly good HUK fighters like Bonal and his men.

C. Inadequate Understanding of Tactical Leadership:

Equally deficient was the Party leadership in their understanding of tactical leadership. From the beginning, we tended to overestimate our own strength and correspondingly underestimate the strength of the enemy. The Party prohibited the getting of Japanese residence certificates. The Party leadership only saw the strong mass organizations around them and failed to see that in many regions the *

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